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SENTENCING AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES: BANISHMENT OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN ROBBERS
INTRODUCTION

In Everett, Washington, two teenage Tlingit' American Indian boys brutally beat and robbed a pizza deliveryman.2 The boys
pled guilty to committing robbery in the first degree.3 On July 13,
1994, a Snohomish County, Washington state judge referred the
sentencing of the two boys to the Tlingit American Indian tribal
court.4 At the request of an American Indian tribal judge 5 on be-

half of the boys, the Washington state judge postponed official
sentencing and agreed to refer sentencing to an American Indian
tribal court for the traditional American Indian procedure of trial
and banishment.6
The tribal judges sentenced the American Indian teenagers to
banishment for up to two years on separate, uninhabited islands
in Alaska.' In addition to the banishment sentence, the tribal

1. Tlingit is pronounced Klink-et. Michael Sangiacomo, A Different Kind of
Justice:Alaskan Indian Court May Open Door to Alternatives, PLAIN DEALER, Sept.
11, 1994, at 1A.
2. The two boys smashed the victim's skull with a baseball bat, leaving him
deaf in one ear; they also robbed him of $50. Timothy Egan, Tribal Justice for
Robbers Called Hoax: Boys to be Banished Have Skipped Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 1994, at Al.
3. Brian S. Akre, Indian Teens Await Banishment Hearing on Alaska Fishing
Boat, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Sept. 1, 1994, at A2. In Washington, "[a] person is
guilty of robbery in the first degree if in the commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, he: ... (c) inflicts bodily injury." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.56.200 (West 1988).
4. Modern Court Adopts Ancient Tribal Justice: 2 Teenagers Banished to Islands for Year, WASH. POST, July 16, 1994, at A3 [hereinafter Modern Court].
5. Rudy James is the head judge of the Kuye Di Kuiu Kwaan, a Tlingit tribal
court. Sangiacomo, supra note 1, at IA. One of the boys' grandfathers asked James
to intervene on behalf of the boys. Id.
6. Akre, supra note 3, at A2. The prosecutor objected to the referral, arguing
that "I have ... difficulty in accepting the idea that we treat people differently
under the law because they come from different cultural backgrounds. I can see
now I'll be facing all kinds of motions and arguments based on someone's cultural
background." Modern Court, supra note 4, at A3.
7. Akre, supra note 3, at A2. The tribal court sent the two American Indian
boys into the harsh wilderness armed with only basic necessities, a dog to warn
them of bears and wolves and a 12 by 12 foot wooden shelter. Sangiacomo, supra
note 1, at IA. They will have to fish and catch animals for food. Id.
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court awarded the victim $5,000 and a house that the tribe would
build to compensate for his injuries.' If after the banishment sentence, the Washington judge finds tribal punishment failed to
rehabilitate the boys, the Washington court may still impose prison sentences of two and one-half to five and one-half years. 9
This Note examines the constitutionality of the Washington
judge's referral of sentencing to the American Indian tribal court.
Part I of this Note sets forth a history of American Indian sovereignty in the United States and the alterations to the American
Indians' special legal status throughout the years. Part II describes how, by referring sentencing of the American Indian felons
to an American Indian tribal court, the State of Washington denied the boys equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part III explains how, by allowing the tribal court's
banishment sentence, the state violated the boys' Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Finally,
Part IV of this Note explains why state judges should not be allowed to refer sentences to American Indian tribal courts.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES: THE GRADUAL DIMINUTION OF AMERICAN
INDIANS' SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS

Since the earliest years of this nation, the United States has
recognized that American Indian tribes have a legal existence
separate from that of non-American Indians.'0 This special legal
status granted American Indians the power of self-government."
Part I will trace the historical development of the American
Indians' special legal status in the United States. Specifically Part
I describes the absolute sovereignty American Indians once retained and shows the gradual diminution of American Indians'
special legal status in the United States.
A. American Indians Possessed Absolute Sovereignty

Of all the minority groups in the United States today, American Indian tribes alone possess a special legal status. 12 The United States recognizes the American Indian tribes as a third sovereign, in addition to the federal and state governments.' 3 Al8. Sangiacomo, supra note 1, at IA.
9. Akre, supra note 3, at A2.
10. Patrick Macklem, DistributingSovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of
Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1312 (1993).
11. Christina D. Ferguson, Comment, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day Lesson on Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REV. 275, 276 (1993).
12. Teresa La Fromboise & Richard La Fromboise, CriticalLegal and Social Responsibilities Facing Native Americans, in INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22
(Laurence French ed., 1982).
13. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M.
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though the American Indians are citizens of the United States, 4
by virtue of their tribal affiliations they also possess "special
rights which 15emanate from their special legal status of 'internal
sovereignty.''

In the late 1700's, when American Indian tribes first began
their relationship with the federal government, American Indians
attained their status as self-governing entities through treaty
negotiations with whites."6 These early treaties basically established that the United States government would hold in trust the
American Indian land Americans now enjoy. 17 In return, American Indians could live autonomously, free from external control,
and maintain their own authority within the limits of their own
reservation lands." Congress, with its plenary powers, could enact laws concerning trust property and tribal government powers
which would regulate and modify the sovereignty of the tribes."9

L. REV. 225, 232 (1994).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988). The Citizenship Act of 1924 made all non-citizen
American Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States "citizens of
the United States irrespective of their desire in the matter. . . ." Robert N. Clinton,
Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMErTE L. REV. 841, 854 (1990).

15. Fromboise & Fromboise, supra note 12, at 22. Sovereignty may be defined
as "the self-sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political
powers are derived... supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the absolute right
to govern." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
16. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 481.
The treaty provides that:
[t]he United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the
Cherokee nation in the foregoing article shall, in no future time without
their consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any
State or Territory. But they shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right by
their national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they
may deem necessary for the government and protection of the persons and
property within their own country belonging to their people or such persons
as have connected themselves with them....
Id.
The federal government had a mutual trust relationship in which it provided
the American Indians protection from the states so that the American Indian
tribes could achieve self-government and self-sufficiency. Connie K. Haslam, Note,
Indian Sovereignty: Confusion Prevails, 63 WASH. L. REV. 169, 178 (1988).
17. See William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law
Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (explaining the territorial test that was the
basis of federal American Indian law at the time the United States made treaties
with the American Indians).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1. Congress derives its broad power to deal with American Indian
tribes from two sources. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have
the power "[t]o regulate commerce ...with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3. (cited in Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587, 596 (1979)). Second, the guardian-ward relationship
between the federal government and the American Indian tribes came about as a
result of the conquest of the American Indians which left them "an uneducated,
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Because American Indians' sovereignty did not emanate from the
Constitution, constitutional restraints and federal laws did not
apply to them unless Congress expressly limited tribal power.2 ° 21
Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in Worcester v. Georgia
provided an initial basis for American Indian tribal sovereignty.22 In 1832, the Supreme Court in Worcester recognized American Indians as having exclusive jurisdiction within their territorial boundaries. 2 ' The Court held that American Indian nations
retained the inherent sovereign power of self-government, and
that state laws did not apply within American Indian country.24
B. American Indian Tribal Sovereignty -

The Erosion Begins

Tribal sovereignty has undergone considerable degeneration
since the making of the treaties and the Worcester decision. 2
Initially, states could not intervene in tribal affairs unless Congress expressly delegated the power to them. 2 ' Congress was the
only governmental body that was able to limit, alter, or dissolve
any powers of self-government which the American Indians possessed." The American Indians had the right to full jurisdiction
over all matters that took place within the reservation.25
helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of others
and their own improvidence." Id. at 596-97. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1994) (illustrating how Congress usurped jurisdiction from tribal courts by
conferring federal jurisdiction over 14 major crimes involving American Indian
perpetrators). See generally Chriss Wetherington, Note, Criminal Jurisdiction of
Tribal Courts over Nonmember Indians: The Circuit Split, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1053,
1059-64 (1989) (explaining the current statutory scheme for criminal jurisdiction in
American Indian country).
20. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896).
21. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
22. Charles F. Wilkinson, Basic Doctrines of American Indian Law, in INDIANS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 76 (Laurence French ed., 1982).
23. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. The Court held that American Indian
reservations were "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied [sic] by the United States." Id.
24. Id. at 561. The Court in Worcester held that state law does not apply to
American Indian tribes. Id. Later cases make it clear that Congress has superior
legislative authority over American Indian tribal sovereignty or self-government.
Wilkinson, supra note 22, at 76.
25. Canby, supra note 17, at 6.
26. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. States could not deal with American Indian tribes unless Congress expressly delegated power to the states. Id. The Court's
attitude towards the American Indian tribes' legal status was clearly expressed for
the first time in 1831 by Chief Justice John Marshall. In Cherokee Nation, the
Supreme Court invalidated a series of state laws that extended over the Cherokee
territory. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 1 (1831).
27. Ferguson, supra note 11, at 282.
28. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (recognizing that
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It was not until 1881, in United States v. McBratney,29 that
the Supreme Court granted state courts the power to deal with
non-American Indian crimes that took place in American Indian
country.3 ° McBratney gave state courts jurisdiction over certain
matters that took place within American Indian territory, depending on the nature of the subject matter and the identity of the
parties involved, so long as no interest of the tribe was affected.31 Not only did McBratney cloud Chief Justice Marshall's tidy
jurisdictional view in Worcester,32 the case divested the American
Indian tribes of their absolute sovereignty over matters that took
place in their territory.3 3
C. Congress Diminishes American Indian Sovereignty
In addition to the courts, Congress also diminished the American Indians' power of self-government while it increased the
power of the states over the American Indians. 4 In general,
states lacked jurisdiction over American Indian matters on American Indian reservations until the federal government granted

American Indian nations were "distinct communit[ies], occupying [their] own territory [within which their authority is exclusive].... The laws of [a state] can have
no force" within reservation boundaries). Chief Justice Marshall's division of power
was purely geographical. This "territorial test" inherently empowered tribes to
govern everything that happened within their territorial borders. Canby, supra
note 17, at 3.
29. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
30. See id. at 624. It was not until McBratney that the Supreme Court ruled
that Congress could not have intended the total exclusion of state power over completely non-American Indian crimes that just happen to take place in American
Indian country. Haslam, supra note 16, at 171. McBratney held that "[tihe courts of
the United States ... have no jurisdiction to punish crimes within that reservation, unless so far as may be necessary to carry out such provisions of the treaty
with the Ute Indians as remain in force." 104 U.S. at 624. See also Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) (holding that the state had jurisdiction over a crime
committed by a non-American Indian in American Indian territory).
31. Haslam, supra note 16, at 171. Where a case involves no American Indian
parties and does not affect tribal self-government, the state courts do have jurisdiction. Id. When American Indians or American Indian interests are involved,
states do not have power unless it is conferred by a federal statute or treaty.
Canby, supra note 17, at 5. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (rejecting
state court jurisdiction over a civil claim by a non-American Indian against an
American Indian, involving a transaction that occurred on an American Indian
reservation, because state jurisdiction would affect matters of American Indian
interests and infringe on the right of American Indians to govern themselves). See
also Wetherington, supra note 19, at 1055, 1060-64 (explaining the criminal jurisdiction rules for crimes committed on American Indian reservations).
32. Canby, supra note 17, at 4.
33. Id. However, American Indian tribes probably had very little interest in
dealing with crimes involving only non-American Indians when the occurrence of
the crime on the reservation was largely a matter of chance. Id.
34. Haslam, supra note 16, at 174.
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jurisdiction.35 However, in 1953, to address lawlessness on the
reservations,3 6 Congress granted some states jurisdiction over
criminal and some civil matters by a federal statute, Public Law
280. 37 Public Law 280 does not mention tribal criminal law.38
Tribal criminal law appears to have no operation in those areas
covered by state law because the state law would control in cases
of conflict. 9

35. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71
(1973) (holding unlawful Arizona's state individual income tax when applied to reservation American Indians with respect to income derived wholly from reservation

sources).
36. S. REP. No. 699, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953). See also Carole E. Goldberg,
Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22
UCLA L. REV. 535, 541 (1975) (discussing why Congress enacted Public Law 280).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994). In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280 which
transferred criminal jurisdictional power from the federal government to the territorial or state government in five states: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon
and Wisconsin as well as the Alaskan territory. The Act provides:
Each of the States or Territories ... shall have jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country ... to the
same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of
such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere with the State or Territory....

Id.
Currently, a total of 16 states have assumed jurisdiction over reservations by
statute or state constitutional amendment. There has been either total or partial
assumption of jurisdiction by Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Washington. Felix S. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 362-63 n.125 (1982 ed.). See Sandra Hansen, Survey of Civil
Jurisdictionin Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 336 n.124 (1991)).
See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1865 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 285.16 (West
1991); IDAHO CODE § 67-5101 to -5103 (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 1.12-1.14 (West
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 83-801 to -806 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.430 (1986);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-19-01 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. §§ 1-1-12 to -21 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-36-9 to 63-36-21 (1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 37.12.010 to .070 (West 1988).
38. See Goldberg, supra note 35, at 545-51 (discussing American Indian opposition to Public Law 280 which ousted functioning tribal courts and gave certain
states jurisdiction over American Indian criminal matter).
39. Goldberg, supra note 35, at 545-51. Public Law 280 extends general criminal jurisdiction over all crimes committed in American Indian country to those
states to which it applies. Otherwise, tribal criminal jurisdiction is exclusive for
non-major crimes committed by American Indians against American Indians in
American Indian country. Tribes also retain concurrent jurisdiction (with the federal government) over non-major crimes committed by American Indians against
non-American Indians in American Indian country. H. BARRY HOLT & GARY
FORRESTER, DIGEST OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 74-75 (1990).
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D. Congress Places Constitutional Restraints on American Indian
Tribal Governments

Due to their special legal status, American Indian tribal
governments did not have to follow the provisions of the Constitution.4 ° Specifically, even when the Citizenship Act of 1924 made
American Indians citizens of the United States,4 ' tribal governments continued to violate the constitutional rights of American
Indians.42 However, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 43 giving American Indians protections similar to the
Bill of Rights in the Constitution." The Act provided that "any
Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local government shall
with certain exceptions, be subject to the same limitations and
restraints as those which are imposed on the government of the
United States by the Constitution."41 Congress enacted the statute to "protect Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal
governments." 46
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 emphasized the rights of
American Indians as United States citizens by mandating that
American Indian governments uphold the individual rights granted in the United States Constitution.47 As a result, the Act naturally diminishes American Indian sovereignty and self-government. 4s By attempting to protect American Indians from their

40. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (stating that constitutional
restraints limit actions of the federal government and the states but not the

tribes).
41. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Citizenship
Act of 1924.
42. See, e.g., Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
43. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1988). This Act placed constitutional-like restrictions
on tribal governments that are similar to the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. G. Kenneth Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 617, 617 (1968). Specifically, the Act states that "[n]o Indian
tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... (7) require excessive bail,
impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments,... (8) deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws. . . ." 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(1988 & 1995 Supp.).
44. Hearings on S. 961-68 and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings].Congress felt that absent imposition by statute, the
fundamental guarantees of the Constitution did not protect American Indians, as
United States citizens, in tribal court actions. Id.
45. Reiblich, supra note 43, at 621 (quoting Senate Hearings, supra note 43, at
1-6).
46. S. REP. NO. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967).
47. Fromboise & Fromboise, supra note 12, at 23.
48. Reiblich, supra note 43, at 644. See also Alvin J. Ziontz, Note, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1, 25-34 (1970)
(discussing the potential threat to tribal autonomy arising from the enactment of
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own people, the Indian Civil Rights Act further eroded their special status as sovereign entities.49 The Act now subjects American Indian tribal governments to the same limitations and restraints imposed on federal, state and local governments by the
Constitution of the United States. 0

II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
American Indians today are entitled to the same rights and
privileges as any other citizens. 5 One crucial guarantee Ameri-

can Indians enjoy is the right to equal protection under the laws.
The state of Washington violated this right by referring the boys
to the tribal court for sentencing. Indeed, it is too plain to argue
that if the boys were white, they would never have received this
singular sentence. The Equal Protection Clause52 forbids this
sort of discriminatory behavior.
A. The Purpose Behind Equal Protection

Governments sometimes necessarily have to classify special
groups or classes of individuals.5 3 However, the government cannot classify individuals on an arbitrary basis.54 The Equal Protection Clause requires equal enforcement of the laws."5 It guarantees that the government will treat similarly situated individu-

als in a similar manner.5" Equal protection concerns may thus

the Indian Civil Rights Act).
49. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978) (recognizing that
Congress had not intended to infringe upon tribal sovereignty when enacting the
Indian Civil Rights Act). Thus, the Supreme Court refused to find a cause of action
under the Indian Civil Rights Act until Congress makes clear that such an intrusion into tribal sovereignty is permissible. Id. at 72.
50. Fromboise & Fromboise, supra note 12, at 23. However, the responsibility
for enforcing the provisions of the Act remains with tribal governments and tribal
courts. Ferguson, supra note 11, at 293.
51. HOLT & FORESTER, supra note 38, at 36 (1990). See supra notes 43-50 and
accompanying text for a discussion of American Indians' rights.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment commands that
"[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." (emphasis added). Id.
53. See, e.g., Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949) (describing the standards of review under the equal protection analysis).
54. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
55. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (demanding that in addition to fair or equal enforcement of laws, that the law itself be "equal").
56. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2, at 317 (1986). See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
75 (1971) (stating that in order not to violate the Equal Protection Clause, the
statutory classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest on some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of legisla-
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arise when governmental actions classify individuals for different
benefits or burdens under the law.57
Under the equal protection analysis, courts may apply one of
two tests to determine whether a classification is constitutional.
When the classification involves a "suspect classification," courts
apply strict scrutiny.58 Courts will not defer to the legislature
when it intentionally confers burdens and benefits on a class of
individuals based on a suspect classification." Suspect classes,
which often include victims of discrimination, need judicial protection since the ordinary political processes for redressing injury are
inaccessible to them because of prejudice.6 ° Classic examples of
suspect classes include minority groups based on race or national

origin.6'
The Fourteenth Amendment traditionally requires a very
heavy burden of justification for statutes drawn according to
race. 62 Courts apply a strict scrutiny analysis to such classifications. The classification must necessarily further a compelling
state interest, independent of racial discrimination, and courts
must find that the legislature could not accomplish its goal by the
least restrictive means.6 3 In most circumstances, courts will find
racial classifications irrelevant to any constitutionally acceptable

tion, so that all persons of similar circumstances shall be treated alike).
57. ROTUNDA, supra note 56, § 18.1 at 314.
58. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967) (holding that where a
statute rests solely upon distinction drawn according to race, the Equal Protection
Clause demands that a court subject the racial classifications to the "most rigid
scrutiny"); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny
to determine whether the systematic exclusion of a class of persons based on national origin from jury service violates equal protection). See generally ROTUNDA,
supra note 56, § 18.5, at 363 (discussing the standard of review for legislation that
discriminates against a suspect class).
59. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). Classifying persons
according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate
public concerns. Id.
60. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-13, at 1012 (2d
ed. 1988). "[Plrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial scrutiny." United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
61. TRIBE, supra note 60, § 16-14, at 1012.
62. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9. All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944). See also Graham v. Richardson 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (explaining that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny).
63. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18 (sustaining a military
order excluding Americans of Japanese origin from designated West Coast areas
following Pearl Harbor).
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legislative purpose.6'
On the other hand, in a situation that does not operate to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, courts often use the rational basis test.65 This test merely requires some rational basis
or legitimate public purpose for the legislation which draws a
certain classification. 6 Under the rational basis test, courts usually defer to the wisdom of the legislature and finds a legitimate
purpose.6 7
The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination.6 ' Thus, there needs to be state action in
order to trigger equal protection analysis.6 9 State action exists
when the court "exercise[s] coercive power or ... provide[s] such
significant encouragement... that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State." 0 Actions of judicial officers in
their official capacity clearly constitute state action governed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.7

64. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). Courts rarely sustain
statues in the face of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny review is 'strict" in theory but
usually "fatal" in fact. Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219 n.6. But see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
214 (holding that it was within the war power of Congress to exclude JapaneseAmericans from certain areas to prevent espionage and sabotage).
65. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). In some
instances, courts apply heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S.
91, 99 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to illegitimacy-based classifications);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications).
66. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314 (employing the relatively relaxed rational
basis standard).
67. E.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). The Fourteenth Amendment erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Id.
at 13.
69. Claude v. Collins, 507 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). Private conduct abridges no individual rights unless there is state involvement in that conduct. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).
70. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). See Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (holding that a city ordinance constituted
state action). See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879) (stating that "no
agency of the State, or of the offices or agents by whom its powers are exerted,
shall deny to any person within her jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
But see Chavous v. Brown, 302 S.E.2d 98, 99 (S.C. 1990) (concluding that the trial
judge's involvement did not constitute state action because it did not require any
judicial discretion).
71. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (deciding that actions of state
courts and judicial officers in their official capacity constitute state action subject
to the restraints of the Constitution); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 347 (stating
that "[a] State acts by its legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities"). See
also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (illustrating an overt state judicial
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If all legal restrictions which apply racial classifications are
immediately suspect, it would appear that courts must apply
strict scrutiny to all state action which singles out American Indians for special treatment. Indeed, much "Indian" legislation would
be unconstitutional if it had to undergo strict scrutiny. Courts
have not, however, always agreed that legislation which singles
out American Indians must be subject to the strict scrutiny
test.73 The next section discusses how the courts have decided
equal protection challenges in American Indian-related cases.
B. American Indians and the Equal Protection Clause
Equal protection analysis in American Indian-related cases
differs from the analysis in other equal protection cases.74 This
section will show the historical basis for applying the American
Indians' unique equal protection standard. This section then will
examine cases that have analyzed the constitutionality of treatment that gives American Indians differential treatment. Finally,
this section will explain why a court should apply strict scrutiny
to the Washington court's referral of sentencing to the American
Indian tribes.
Despite the fact that American Indians are a separate "race,"
courts have been reticent to apply strict scrutiny to laws which
confer special benefits or burdens upon American Indians. In fact,
courts generally apply the rational basis test to American Indian
related cases. 5 Federal courts especially have been hesitant to
impose equal protection limitations on laws affecting American
Indians.76 This is due to the fiduciary relationship between the

action which violated the Equal Protection Clause). A Florida trial court awarded
custody of a child to the respondent because the petitioner was cohabitating with
an African-American. Id. The trial court reasoned that raising a child in a racially
mixed household would have a damaging impact on the child. Id. The Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny and reversed, holding that a state court's overt consideration of community racial bias in determining child custody violated equal
protection. Id.
72. David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians As
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 760 (1991).
73. E.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974); Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
74. Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54
WASH. L. RE V. 587, 589 (1979).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (upholding legislation which operated to disadvantage American Indians because it is in furtherance of the federal government's unique obligation to American Indian tribes);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (recognizing that federal regulations singling out American Indians has repeatedly been sustained against claims of racial
discrimination).
76. Johnson, supra note 74, at 589. Courts have upheld several laws challenged
as creating racial classifications as being rationally related to the government's
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federal government and American Indian tribes which gives Congress the power to enact laws that treat American Indians differently.77
7
The Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Morton v. Mancari
"
is a cornerstone of modern American Indian equal protection doctrine.7 9 In Morton, non-American Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) challenged a federal statute which
provided for an employment preference for qualified American
Indians in the BIA. 80 The Court applied only minimal scrutiny,
stating that "[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
American Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed."8 ' Thus the Court refused to interfere with Congress'
leg82
islation that gave American Indians special treatment.
In Morton, the Court justified its use of the rational basis
test by distinguishing that discrimination singling out American
Indians is unlike discrimination singling out other racial minorities; the classification of American Indians is of a political, not
racial, nature. 3 Federal regulation of American Indian tribes is
rooted in the unique status of American Indians as "a separate
people" with their own political institutions, and is not to be
viewed as legislation of a "'racial group' consisting of
'Indians'... ."4 Thus, the Supreme Court stated that the equal
'unique obligations toward the Indians." Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F.
Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
77. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 589-90. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the power Congress has to deal with American
Indian tribes.
78. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
79. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 595. Although Morton was decided on
Due Process rather than Equal Protection grounds, "the Court's determination
regarding the nature of the discrimination is applicable to Equal Protection analysis." Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527, 1529 n.3 (D.N.M. 1990).
80. Morton, 417 U.S. at 535.
81. Id. at 555.
82. Id. at n.24 (reasoning that the preference is not directed toward a "racial"
group consisting of "Indians"; instead, it applies only to members of "federally recognized" tribes. Thus, preference is political rather than racial in nature). The
Court decided that a statute which granted an employment preference to American
Indians did not unconstitutionally discriminate against non-American Indians. Id.
at 554. The court analogized the preference as similar to a United States Senator
who employs members of his own constituent group. Id. The employment preference for American Indians grants American Indians, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities, the ability to further the cause of American Indian self-government and to make the Bureau of Indian Affairs more responsive to the needs of its
constituent groups. Id.
83. Id. See generally David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 786 (1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court's political/racial distinction made in Morton).
84. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553.
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protection review need not entail the strict scrutiny which it usus5
ally applies to racial classifications.
However, in 1977, the Supreme Court did not rely on the
political/racial distinction when it applied the rational basis test
in United States v. Antelope."6 Instead, the Court justified its
application of the rational basis standard on the federal
government's unique obligation to American Indian tribes. 7 In
Antelope, the American Indian defendants, convicted of felony
murder in federal court, contended that had they been non-American Indian, they would have been subject to Idaho law which
required a greater burden of proof on the prosecution."' Instead,
because they were American Indian, the Major Crimes Act 9 subjected the defendants to federal law for first-degree felony murder. 90
The Supreme Court held that although the federal regulation
did not further American Indian self-government, as in Morton,
the regulation in Antelope involved federal regulation of criminal
activity in American Indian country. 9' Courts defer to Congress'

85. Id. at 555. As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the American Indians, the court
will not disturb such legislative judgments. Id. In Morton, the court found that the
preference is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government.
Id. See also Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 F.2d 347, 354 (8th Cir. 1978)
(recognizing that even after Morton, "in certain contexts separate classification and
treatment of American Indians as a race are constitutionally permissible in the
light of the unique status of American Indians in this country, and in the light of
history and policy"). But see Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not 'Strictly" Racial: A
Response to "Indiansas Peoples", 39 UCLA L. REV. 169 (1991) (criticizing Williams'
support of distinguishing between political and racial classifications and arguing
for a different approach to racial classifications of American Indians and equal
protection).
86. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). In Antelope, through the Major Crimes Act, which gives
the federal courts jurisdiction over American Indians who commit a major crime,
the federal court prosecuted and convicted the American Indian defendants of firstdegree felony murder of a non-American Indian woman. Id. at 644. The defendants
appealed their convictions, arguing that if the defendants had been non-American
Indian, they would have been subject to Idaho law. Id. Idaho law contained no
felony murder provisions and required proof of premeditation and deliberation for
a conviction of first-degree murder. Id. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals had reversed the convictions by applying strict scrutiny reasoning
that the federal guardianship of American Indians could not justify a criminal
statute that worked to the disadvantage of the American Indians. United States v.
Antelope 523 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
87. See generally, Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 603 (discussing how the
Supreme Court applied equal protection analysis to legislation which disadvantaged American Indians).
88. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 644.
89. See supra note 19 for a discussion of the Major Crimes Act.
90. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 644 n.4.
91. Id. at 646.
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regulation of American Indian affairs 92 because it is rooted in the
unique status of American Indians as "a separate people" with
their own political institutions.93 The term "Indian" in the Major
Crimes Act, however, applied to all American Indians on the basis
94
of race or ancestry and did not require enrollment in a tribe.
Thus, Antelope allowed special federal American Indian legislation
to be applied to individual American Indians, regardless of tribal
affiliation.9 5
Thus, the Court apparently defers to any federal legislation
enacted which singles out American Indians regardless of detriment or benefit to American Indians.9" Courts will not disturb
statutes providing special treatment for American Indians as long
as the legislation can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation towards American Indians. 9v However, this reason, to further the trust relationship designed to protect American Indians, loses its strength when utilized to uphold
prejudicial rather than beneficial treatment of American Indians.98 Indeed, without strict scrutiny, American Indians cannot
strike down laws that harm them. 99
The need for strict scrutiny is even more crucial with regard
to states because states do not have the same trust relationship
toward American Indians as the federal government does.'00

92. E.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Gray v. United States,
394 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1967). "It has long been acknowledged that Congress has
recognized and established for the American Indian people a peculiar and protected status as wards of the Federal government." Id. at 98. The Court has repeatedly
stated that the power to regulate the American Indians rests with Congress. Id.
93. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646.
94. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 604.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 605.
97. Morton, 417 U.S. at 555. "Ifthe Court deemed the laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only American Indians, as invidious racial discrimination, it would effectively erase an entire Title of the United
States Code (25 U.S.C.), and the solemn commitment of the Government toward
the American Indians would be jeopardized." Id. at 552.
98. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 606. Congress created the United
States Sentencing Commission to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records, who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct. Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discriminationin Punishment? 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781,
792 (1993).
99. Williams, supra note 72, at 769.
100. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 609. Cf Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque,
751 F. Supp. 1527, 1530 (D.N.M. 1990) (holding that although Congress has a
unique obligation toward American Indians, a city does not have comparable power
to treat members of tribes differently). But see Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp.
825, 830-32 (D.N.M. 1978) (holding that a state owned museum's policy that singles out American Indians for preferential treatment furthers the special federal
relationship towards American Indians).
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Thus, courts should apply stricter scrutiny to any state law or
administrative action which disadvantages American Indians.'0 '
Morton and Antelope stress the unique status of American Indians
in the context of federal action.' °2 The same basis for permitting
differential treatment of tribal American Indians is not present in
this case. This case does not involve a federal statute. It does not
involve Congress. It does not involve any federal action whatsoever. Therefore, because the referral is not in furtherance of
Congress' unique obligation to American Indian tribes, as in Morton or Antelope, a court should apply a stricter equal protection
analysis.
C. Application of Equal ProtectionAnalysis to State Court
Sentencing Judge's Actions
Strict scrutiny should apply where the purpose for the distinctive treatment does not further the unique obligation towards
the American Indians."°3 Thus, any state action directed at persons of the American-Indian race as members of a racially-defined
class must undergo strict scrutiny to prevent invidious discrimination. ' 4 This section will apply strict scrutiny to the Washington
judge's actions and show how the judge's ruling discriminated
against the two American Indian boys, and thus, denied them the
equal protection of the laws.
In general, state discrimination can withstand strict scrutiny
only if the classification advances a compelling state interest by
the least restrictive means available. 0 5 Since referral of tribal
American Indians to their own court subjects American Indians to
unconventional sentences, it may be difficult to find a compelling
state interest which justifies distinguishing American Indians in
sentencing.
One possible compelling state interest in referring sentencing
to the tribal court is to further American Indian self-government.106 Courts generally consider legislation that gives differ-

101. Cf Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop
Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1385, 1393 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (recognizing that while the federal government may establish special preferences in favor of
American Indians without running afoul of the requirements of the Constitution,
private persons are not free to discriminate against American Indians for the same
reason).
102. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 74, at 609-10. See supra note 78-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Morton and Antelope.
103. E.g., United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (deciding that the Court must apply strict scrutiny since race is a suspect classification).
104. TRIBE, supra note 60, § 16-14, at 1017.
105. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
106. See supra notes 78-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of furthering
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ential treatment to American Indians to be constitutional because
such legislation promotes tribal self-government and supports the
trust relationship that was made long ago.' °7 Another possible
compelling state interest is to rehabilitate the American Indian
boys.10 8
Regardless of whether either of these state interests are sufficiently "compelling," the Washington court's actions fail to substantially advance either one of them by the least restrictive
means. In order to pass the strict scrutiny test, the classification
must be necessary to achieve the compelling state interest.' °9
Referring the American Indian boys to the tribal court for sentencing does not advance the compelling state interest through
the least restrictive means.
If the state's goal is to further tribal self-government, it is
highly unlikely that the judge's distinctive treatment of the American Indian boys achieves it. Allowing an American Indian tribal
court to sentence the boys to a historically "Indian" punishment
does not promote general tribal self-government. Furthermore, the
state judge's referral is limited to this one isolated instance. It is
difficult to see how the compelling state interest of tribal selfgovernment is furthered by sentencing two teenage boys to a bizarre punishment that is worse than what non-American Indians
convicted of the same crime would have received.
The state judge's distinctive treatment of the American Indian defendants also fails to accomplish another possible state interest, rehabilitation, through the least restrictive means. The judge
could easily rehabilitate the defendants in a way that would not
call for classifying American Indians. The court could have imprisoned the boys or required them to undergo treatment. Indeed,
there is nothing about these modern American Indian boys that
makes rehabilitation more likely through the traditional punishment of banishment. The judge's classification will not withstand
strict scrutiny and therefore it violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Previous cases have held that detrimental treatment in the
sentencing of American Indians violates the Equal Protection
Clause." ° In United States v. Cleveland,"' the Ninth Circuit

American Indian self-government in Morton and Livingston.
107. Morton, 417 U.S. at 552. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the trust relationship between the American Indians and the federal
government.
108. Tribe Banishes Duo to Alaskan Islands, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1994, at A30
[hereinafter Tribe Banishes Duo].
109. ROTUNDA, supra note 56, § 18.3, at 324.
110. E.g., United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist., 226 P. 926, 928-29 (Cal. 1924). An American Indian
child sought a court order compelling a state public school to admit her. Id. The
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analyzed the interplay between two statutes; the result of which
subjected American Indians to more severe punishment than nonAmerican Indians who committed the same crime." 2 The Court
found that the statutes violated Equal Protection because they
created substantial disparities between American Indian defendants and non-American Indian defendants who are charged with
committing identical offenses.13
Similarly, the Washington judge's referral to the tribal courts
resulted in sentencing the American Indian defendants to a worse
punishment than what non-American Indian defendants charged
with committing the same offense would have received. The only
reason for the disparity in sentences is due to the defendants'
race. In Pace v. Alabama,"4 the Supreme Court stated, in dicta,
that any person, "whatever his race.., shall not be subjected, for
the same offense, to any greater or different punishment."" 5
Thus, not only does the state judge's referral fail strict scrutiny,
courts have specifically stated that defendants cannot receive
different punishments for identical offenses based solely on their
race. 116
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishments applies to state
prosecutions."17 By referring sentencing to tribal court for banishment, the state court violated the defendants' Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, the banishment sentence violates the boys' rights under

Supreme Court of California held that denying children admittance to common
schools solely because of racial differences violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
111. 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 1072 n.5. It also reduced the prosecutor's burden of proof. Id. at 1072.
The sole distinction between the defendants subjected to state law and those to
whom federal law applies was the race of the defendant. Id. The court applied
strict scrutiny and found no federal or state interest. Id.
113. Id. The Supreme Court distinguished Cleveland from Antelope in that Cleveland is concerned with instances in which American Indians tried in federal court
are subjected to differing penalties and burdens of proof from those applicable to
non-American Indians charged with the same offense. United States v. Antelope,
430 U.S. 641, 649 (1971). In Antelope, the Supreme Court found that the challenged federal legislation did not violate equal protection since it applied
evenhandedly to both American Indians and non-American Indians, regardless of
the laws of States with respect to the same offense. Id.
114. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
115. Id. at 584.
116. E.g., id.
117. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). The Court held that a
state law which imprisons a person for having a narcotic addiction is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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the Indian Civil Rights Act.
First, this Part describes banishment as a traditional form of
American Indian punishment. This Part then sets forth the standards used to determine cruel and unusual punishment and
shows how banishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in our society today. Next, this Part examines how the tribal court
also violated the boys' rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Finally, this Part shows that regardless of the fact that the defendants consented to the banishment sentence, the state judge
should not have allowed the banishment sentence.
A. Banishment as TraditionalAmerican Indian Punishment
Banishment as a punishment has existed throughout the
world since ancient times."' American Indians used this traditional form of punishment for rehabilitative purposes." 9 Although the American Indians employed banishment, public ridicule and restitution also played large roles in traditional American Indian dispute resolution and behavior control. 2 ° The absence of prisons prior to Columbus's arrival called for these forms
of punishment.' 2 ' The American Indian approach to criminal
justice called for rehabilitation of the criminal and assistance for
the victim in order122for the tribe to. accept the criminal back into
their tribal group.
The aim of the sentence is in accord with tribal values: it
seeks to rehabilitate the boys and requires them to reflect on their
crime. 23 Specifically, the tribal court banished the defendants
for one year to separate, uninhabited islands. 24 Although banishment is a traditional form of American Indian punishment, it
is not acceptable in our courts today. 25 Courts have held that

118. Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979).
119. Modern Court, supra note 4, at A3.
120. Samuel J. Brakel, American Indian Tribal Courts, in INDIANS AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 145, 149 (Laurence French ed., 1982). Retaliatory (private) and retributive
(public) death and mutilation were also known forms of punishment. Id.
121. Modern Court, supra note 4, at A3. Whipping and hanging became the accepted forms of public punishment among the Cherokees and remained so until the
1870's when the national jail was constructed at Tahlequah. RENNARD STRICKLAND,
FIRE AND THE SPIRITS 168 (1975).
122. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS 168-74 (1975) (discussing
the development of criminal punishments, from clan revenge to public reform, and
how they reflect the emergence of new Cherokee standards and values).
123. Tribe Banishes Duo, supra note 108, at A30. Two documentary filmmakers,
who visited the banished defendants and recorded 18 hours of film, reported that
the defendants are spending their time carving wood, writing poetry and contemplating their crime. Wayne Wurzer, Filmmakers Spend FourDays with Teens Banished in Alaska, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at B3.
124. Modern Court, supra note 4, at A3.
125. See infra notes 126-157 and accompanying text for a discussion of banish-
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banishment is cruel and unusual punishment. The next section
will show why this is so.
B. Banishment as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
A court may impose fines, imprisonment and even execution,
depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any punishment
"outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect."' 26 Since the Eighth Amendment fails to provide a
list of what punishments are cruel and unusual, 2 v the Supreme
Court has developed several tests to determine whether a punishment violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 2 One
test questions whether the punishment is inherently cruel. 29
Another test examines whether the state can accomplish its legitimate aim in a less intrusive manner 3 ° If the punishment fails
either one of these tests, it will be deemed cruel and unusual and
thus, unconstitutional.
The first test questions whether the punishment is inherently

ment as cruel and unusual punishment.
126. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). Although some jurisdictions employ
the death penalty, a punishment which does not violate the constitutional concept
of cruelty with regard to murderers, the existence of the death penalty does not
license the government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of
its imagination. Id. at 99. In support of the cruel and unusual punishment clause,
Justice Brennan stated that "even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1971).
127. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. While the State has the power to punish, the purpose
of the Amendment is to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards. Id. Thus, adhering to the purpose of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court often defines cruel and unusual punishment by the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101.
128. This Note will not examine a third test because it is inapplicable to banishment. A court rarely applies a third test other than in the context of long term sentences that might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (holding
that confinement of a prisoner for 12 to 20 years of hard and painful labor for
falsifying a public document violated the protection against cruel and usual punishment in the Philippine Constitution). Courts usually apply this test to assess
whether the length of a sentence is disproportionate to the offense. Id. This test
examines whether the punishment fits the crime or whether the punishment is
excessive in relation to the crime. Id. In applying this test, the court examines the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction and the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime. Id.
129. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (holding that denationalization as a punishment is
barred by the Eighth Amendment). The Court in Trop explained that denationalization "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress....
He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people."
Id. at 98-99.
130. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (determining whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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cruel. Because there are no precise definitions of what is inherently cruel, we must look to what the courts have previously held as
inherently cruel. 31 A punishment need not involve the infliction
of bodily pain or mutilation
in order for it to constitute cruel and
132
unusual punishment.

In this case, the banishment sentence to separate, uninhabited Alaskan islands is inherently cruel in that the boys, armed
with only basic necessities, have to hunt and fish for their own
food. 13 3 Conditions depriving convicts of basic human necessities
such as food, medical care and physical safety trigger Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.13 The State has a duty to provide food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. 13 Courts have found that
continual deprivation of adequate food may inflict cruel and unusual punishment. 3 ' Since the boys will starve if they are unsuccessful in hunting and fishing, their sentence is inherently
cruel.
The State also has an unquestioned duty to provide for the
reasonable safety of its incarcerated prisoners. 137 The fact that
the defendants are not incarcerated should not relieve the State of
its duty to hold criminals in safe conditions. If it is cruel and
unusual to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must
follow that banishing someone to unsafe conditions also is cruel
and unusual.13 Banishment to uninhabited islands subjects the
boys to unsafe conditions; they must fend for themselves in a
harsh wilderness
where bears, wolves and other wild animals may
139
attack them.

131. E.g., id.; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910). The court has not detailed "[t]he exact scope of the constitutional
phrase 'cruel and unusual'." Id. at 354.
132. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-02.
133. Tribe Banishes Duo, supra note 108, at A30.
134. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200
(1989).
135. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). But see Lunsford v. Bennett,
17 F.3d 1574, 1580 (1994) (holding that serving prisoners poorly-prepared food did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the prisoners received three
square meals a day in compliance with nutritional guidelines).
136. See Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288, 1289 (1970) (stating that
prisoner's complaint against prison officials alleging infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment when officials refused to provide food for him during a period of fifty

and one-half hours stated a cause of action); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93,
98 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (holding that the conditions in the county jail which subjected
the prisoners to slow starvation and deprived the prisoners of most human contacts violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
137. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
138. Cf.id. at 315-16 (explaining that if it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, committing someone involuntarily to
confinement in unsafe conditions is similarly unconstitutional).
139. See also Trop v. Dolles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (recognizing that banish-

1995]

Sentencing and Cultural Differences

Also, banishment is inherently cruel because in the event
that one of the boys becomes ill, he will not receive medical attention. The government has an obligation to provide medical care for
those whom it incarcerates. 4 ° Indeed, the withholding of medical attention may actually produce physical torture or lingering
death.' Solitary banishment surely deprives the defendants of
the ability to obtain adequate medical attention. 142
A second test the Supreme Court uses, examines whether the
State can accomplish its legitimate aim in a less intrusive manner; that is, whether the punishment is excessive in relation to
the achievement of legitimate state goals. "' The American Bar
Association recommends using the "least restrictive" means of
punishment that would to accomplish the state's goal.'
Courts clearly hold that banishment from the United States
is cruel and unusual punishment.'" In State v. Sanchez,'" the
Fifth Circuit held that a sentence which imposes banishment from
the United States, as a special condition of probation, is unconstitutional.'4 7 In Dear Wing Jung v. United States,'" the Ninth

Circuit found that a suspended sentence on the condition that the
defendant leave the United States was either cruel and unusual
punishment, or a denial of due process.' 49 Thus, a sentence forcment, a fate universally decried by civilized people, is cruel and unusual because it
subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress).
140. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The banishment sentence should
not release the state's duty to provide medical care. See supra note 138 and accompanying text for reasons why banishment should be treated the same as unsafe
conditions.
141. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. Denial of medical care does not serve any
penological purpose. Id. Both boys have had health problems during their banishment. Michael Sangiacomo, "Banishment" of Indian Teens Under Review: Lead
Tribal Judge Says Process Has Been Corrupted, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 9, 1995, at
13A. One was helicoptered off the island with appendicitis and also suffered from
an infected toe and scabies. Id. The other was taken off the island to have a wisdom tooth removed. Id. Afterwards, he still had problems with another tooth that
needs to be removed. Id.
142. It is true that the tribal court supplied the defendants with two-way radios
in the event of an emergency. Sangiacomo, supra note 1, at 1A. However, a twoway radio may prove inadequate if the defendants need immediate medical attention.
143. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972).
144.

AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING

§ 18-2.4 (1994).
145. See United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 964 (3rd Cir. 1985) (holding
that a district court may not impermissibly impose a condition that a defendant
serve probation time outside the country).
146. State v Sanchez, 462 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1985). The judge suspended
the defendant's sentence on the condition that the defendant permanently return
to Honduras. Id.
147. Id.
148. 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
149. Id. at 76. The court held the condition unconstitutional and remanded the
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ing the defendant out of the country is unconstitutional.
Most courts adhere to the reasoning in People v. Baurn 5
and hold that banishment to another state in the United States is
an unacceptable form of punishment.'' Although banishment
was not cruel and unusual punishment at common law,' 52 such
a method of punishment is not allowed today.' 5' If the power to
banish exists at all, it is with the legislature; and when the legislature does not authorize such methods of punishment, public
policy impliedly prohibits it." Thus, unless a state statute allows banishment, the court cannot use banishment to punish a
criminal.
Notwithstanding the substantial weight of authority finding
banishment as cruel and unusual punishment, some courts have
upheld certain forms of banishment. In Bagley v. Harvey,"'5 the
conditions of the defendant's parole banished the defendant to
Iowa where his parents resided, and forbade him from returning
to Washington until the end of his parole term." 6 Although the
banishment of the boys in this case and in Bagley are somewhat
similar in that both banishment sentences are to another state,
and both allow the defendants to return after the sentence, the
circumstances of the banishments differ substantially. Solitary
banishment to the uninhabited wilderness of an Alaskan island is
not comparable to banishment to Iowa where the defendant's
parents reside. Therefore, the kind of banishment that a court has

case to the District Court for sentencing in accordance with the law. Id.
150. 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930). In Baum, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
a sentence banishing the accused from the state was void as unauthorized and
contrary to public policy. Id. The Court stated that "[t]o permit one state to dump
its convicted criminals into another would ... incite dissension ... among the
several states." Id. at 96. Many states' criminal codes list Baum in the notes as
their policy against banishment. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 28; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22; N.M. CONST. art II, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, §
14.
151. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (W.D. Va.
1979) (recognizing that banishing a criminal to another state was prohibited by
public policy and not in the interest of safety and welfare); State v. Doughtie, 74
S.E.2d 922, 923 (N.C. 1953) (stating that North Carolina courts have no power to
pass a sentence of banishment; if they do pass one, the sentence is void). Some
states expressly prohibit banishment. See ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 21; GA. CONST. art.
I, § I, para. XXI.
152. Baum, 231 N.W. at 96.
153. E.g., Rutherford, 468 F. Supp. at 1360-61; Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d at 923.
154. Baum, 231 N.W. at 96. But see State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga.
1974) (allowing banishment from seven counties in Georgia due to the broad discretion given to trial judges, even though state policy prohibits banishment, and
even though the Georgia Constitution expressly prohibits "[blanishment beyond the
limits of the state, as a punishment for crime").
155. 718 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1983).
156. Id. at 922-23.
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upheld is distinguishable from this banishment sentence to Alaska.
Moreover, since the State's goal in punishment is to protect
the public from the criminal, it is far more prudent to incarcerate
the defendants, rather than risk the chance that they may escape
from the island.'57 Although the State hopes to rehabilitate the
defendants with the banishment sentence, society takes a risk because the defendants may leave the island. The "least restrictive"
means of punishing the defendant is incarceration rather than
banishment. Therefore, because there is a less restrictive alternative, the banishment sentence qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment. Since the Washington court's sentence fails both proper
tests for cruel and unusual punishment the banishment of the
boys is unconstitutional.
C. Banishment Violates the American Indian Civil Rights Act
The Washington judge's action not only violated the U.S.
Constitution, but plainly violated the American Indian Civil
Rights Act. 5 as well. The Act restricts tribal courts from imposing a punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six
months, or a fine of $500, or both.'59
Moreover, the Act prohibits sentences which are cruel and
unusual. As has been shown, 6 ° the banishment punishment is
indeed cruel and unusual. Thus, the Washington judge's sentence
violates the express dictates of the American Indian Civil Rights
Act, as well as the commands of the United States Constitution.
D. Banishment is not a Valid Sentence even with the
Defendants Consent
Another issue that arises in this case is the argument that
the defendants consented to the banishment sentence, and thus,
waived the violation of their constitutional rights. However, even
when given a choice, defendants cannot choose banishment as a

157. See, e.g., Rutherford, 468 F. Supp. at 1360.
158. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1988 & 1995 Supp.). The Indian Civil Rights Act
specifically states that:
[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... require
excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishment,
and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year or a fine of
$5,000, or both.
25 U.S.C. § 1302.
159. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Indian
Civil Rights Act.
160. See supra notes 126-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of why banishment is cruel and unusual.
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sentence. In Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 6 ' the court rejected the government's argument that it had given the defendant
a choice between imprisonment or leaving the United States; the
court found that the banishment condition of the sentence was
either a denial of due process or a cruel and unusual punishment.'62 Under the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice, courts almost uniformly hold certain probation
conditions, most notably those involving banishment from the
jurisdiction of the conviction, invalid. 1"3 Generally, courts reach
these decisions on statutory grounds by interpreting probation
statutes as permitting only conditions that are proportionate to
the offense or which promote public safety or rehabilitation. 1"
Thus, even when courts give defendants the choice in suspending
their imprisonment sentences with banishment, the banishment
condition is not an acceptable form of punishment.
IV.

STATE COURTS SHOULD NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REFER
SENTENCES TO AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS

This case marked the first time a state court judge referred
sentencing to an American Indian tribal court.'65 However, on
May 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals of Washington ruled that the
two teenage American Indians still must face the standard-range
prison sentence once the banishment ended. 6 ' Although the
Court of Appeals found that the trial court's referral in this instance was improper, the Court of Appeals should rule further
and eliminate the state trail courts' authority to refer sentences to
American Indian tribal courts. This Part raises issues concerning

161. 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
162. Id. at 76. The lower court suspended the prison sentence for six months on
the condition that the defendant depart from the United States. Id. at 75.
163. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING
§ 18-3.13 (1994).
164. Id.
165. Akre, supra note 3, at A3.
166. State v. Roberts, 894 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). The Court of
Appeals allowed the boys to finish their banishment sentences and failed to order
the boys to immediate sentencing according to sentencing guidelines. Prison Term
Looms for Banished Teens, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 2, 1995, at B7. Consequently, however, on October 3, 1995, the same state judge who had referred sentencing to the American Indian tribal court, ended the tribal punishment and sentenced the boys to prison according the Washington's sentencing guidelines with
credit for about a year already served. Judge Ends Experiment with Tribal Justice,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1995, § 1, at 6. The judge found the tribal punishment had flaws
which "threatened its credibility and integrity." Id. For example, one of the boys
took a trip to the mainland and applied for a driver's license. George Tibbits, Banishment of Teens in Question: Judge Angry About Visits from Tlingits' Relatives,
MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Aug. 6, 1995, at B4. They have also received repeated visits from their relatives. Id.
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tribal court referrals and ultimately concludes that state courts
should not possess the power to refer such sentences.
This Part first discusses Washington's Sentencing Reform Act
of 1981, which prescribes the proper sentence for the two boys.
Secondly, this Part analyzes the bases for the Court of Appeal's
decision in concluding that the trial court must sentence the
American Indian boys in accordance with the Act. Then, this Part
discusses inherent problems with the American Indian criminal
justice system; specifically, pointing out the unfortunate consequences which may result if other state courts follow the Washington court's lead in referring sentencing of American Indians to
tribal courts. Finally, this Part proposes that the Court of Appeals
of Washington should divest state courts of the power to refer
sentences to American Indian tribal courts.
A. The Court of Appeals Ordered Sentencing in Accordance With
the Sentencing Guidelines
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 provides the
proper guidelines for sentencing the two boys.' 67 Washington enacted these guidelines in an effort to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who are
guilty of similar criminal conduct. 6 ' Sentencing guidelines rate
the gravity of offenses on one axis of a sentencing grid and the
offender's record of convictions on the other.169 The intersection
of these two variables determines the "presumptive sentence
range." 7 ° Under the Sentencing Act, the standard71 sentence for
the boys is between thirty-one to sixty-five months.
The Sentencing Reform Act "requires a trial court to sentence
a criminal offender within a presumptive, or standard range. " "'

167. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.010 (West 1988) (Sentencing Reform Act
of 1981).
168. E.g., Mota v. State 788 P.2d 538, 544 (Wash. 1990). One of the goals of standardized sentencing is equality of incarceration time depending upon the crime. Id.
See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.340 (West 1988) (stating that the guidelines and prosecuting standards apply equally to offenders in all parts of the state,
without discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime or the
previous record of the defendant).
169. John M. Junker, Guidelines Sentencing: The Washington Experience, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 715, 719 (1992). Sentencing guidelines give the greatest weight to
current and past offenses and the circumstances of the crime committed. Id. at
718. Within that framework, they endeavor to impose proportionality and uniformity in sentencing. Id. The guidelines give the least weight to reforming the offender.
Id.
170. Id. at 719.
171. State v. Roberts, 894 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). The standard
sentence is between 31 and 41 months of total confinement; however, the standard
range for using a deadly weapon is between 55 and 65 months. Id.
172. State v. Estrella, 798 P.2d 289, 291 (Wash. 1990). The sentencing commis-
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However, to accommodate an atypical case, the guidelines afford
the court the ability to postpone a sentencing hearing "for good
cause shown." 7 3 Nevertheless, the court abuses its discretion
when it bases the delay on untenable grounds. 74 It is the responsibility of the appellate courts to ensure that trial courts do
not abuse their discretion, and moreover, that the trial courts
follow the guidelines as proscribed in the Sentencing Reform
Act. 175

The Court of Appeals of Washington focused on whether the
trial court had good cause to postpone sentencing.' The Court
identified two of the trial court reasons for delayed sentencing and
correctly held that neither constituted good cause. 177 The Court
of Appeals found that: 1) the trial court improperly implied that a
successful rehabilitation during the banishment could result in an
avoidance of a prison sentence, and 2) the trial court abused its
discretion by delaying criminal sentencing in the hope that by the
end of the banishment sentence, the legislature or appellate
courts will have78 given the courts authority to deviate from the
state sentence.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that following the
period of banishment, a standard range prison sentence inescapably awaits the defendants. 179 However, the Court of Appeals
should have ruled further and eliminated the state courts' ability
to refer sentences to tribal courts. This next section shows why
state courts should never consider sentencing by the American
Indian tribal courts as a viable sentencing option.
B. Dangers in Allowing the American Indian Tribal Courts to
Sentence Their own Members
If the Court of Appeals of Washington had allowed the sentencing judge's referral, the ruling may have emboldened other

sion designed the laws in Washington to limit discretion from the judges and put
criminals in jail as long as possible. Sangiacomo, supra note 1, at 1A.
173. Roberts, 894 P.2d at 1344 n.16 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.110
(West 1988)).
174. Id. at 1344.
175. Id. at 1345.
176. Id. at 1344.
177. Id. at 1345.
178. Roberts, 894 P.2d at 1344-45. The Court specifically stated that "[a]
defendant's good conduct following the commission of a crime is not a factor which
relates to the crime itself or the defendant's criminal record. Therefore, it is not an
appropriate factor to consider in sentencing." Id. at 1345. It was also not appropriate to delay sentencing with the expectation that the prescribed standard sentencing ranges will change and in essence, "treat[ing sentencing law like a stock market, waiting for the opportune moment to get in." Id.
179. Id.
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courts to refer sentencing of American Indian convicts to tribal
courts.18 ° Such an action would present many problems. Many of
these problems are due to the unfortunate aspects of the American Indian tribal justice system.
The American Indian tribal court system is an inherently
unfair and informal one.' 8 1 Although American Indians may encounter serious prejudice in the state or federal courts, a considerable amount of prejudice finds its way into their own tribal
courts. 8 2 American Indian tribal courts are exceedingly personal."s The tribal judges usually know the people who appear before them,"s4 and show favoritism toward council members or
their interests, their friends and other "influential groups.""s
Moreover, most judges lack sufficient training, stature, support, or
experience
to insulate themselves from tribal cliques and dissen86
sions. 1
Due to the bias in tribal courts, criminals with dual citizenship, American Indian and United States, will weigh the possible
punishments, and then choose either tribal court or state
court.8 7 American Indians with friends who are tribal judges
will choose the tribal court, while others will stay in the state
court. This type of forum shopping erodes the whole purpose behind the sentencing referral and can lead to a situation where
American Indians who elect to have sentencing referred to tribal
courts uniformly receive more lenient sentences than American
Indians who rely on state courts for sentencing. Thus, the state
court should not entrust sentencing to the American Indian tribal
court because such referrals result in an inconsistent, inadequate
and unfair judicial system.
Another problem with the American Indian tribal justice
system is that the American Indian culture administers some
punishments which our modern society would regard as barbaric.
If Washington allows the tribal court's banishment sentence, this
may encourage other tribal courts to impose other forms of tradi-

180. Rudy James, a Tlingit American Indian judge, said, "I would like to see the
tribal courts further recognized as a viable sentencing option." Sangiacomo, supra
note 1, at IA.
181. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 93 (1978).
182. Id.
183. BRAKEL, supra note 181, at 94.

184. Id. at 94.
185. Id. If the offender were a tribesman of no particular consequence, and he offended a headman, the punishment would likely be immediate and severe. WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 13 (1966).
186. BRAKEL, supra note 181, at 94. Tribal judges usually lack formal legal training. Id. at 94-95. Also, there is little or no case law restricting their discretionary
power. Id.
187. Sangiacomo, supra note 1, at IA.
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tional American Indian punishments which are not recognized in
our justice system as acceptable forms of punishment.
Several examples will serve to illustrate the barbaric nature
of American Indian punishment. A traditional American Indian
punishment for sexual crimes is "cropping" or defacing.' 88 This
practice involved removing an ear or slashing the nose." 9 Another traditional American Indian punishment involves whipping
the offender with horse quirts.' 90 Such methods of punishment
are not acceptable in our justice system.' 9 ' Instead of risking
the possibility of these bizarre sentences, state courts should altogether eliminate the referral of sentencing to tribal courts.
These undesirable consequences dictate that the Court of
Appeals should have also ruled that state courts cannot refer sentences to American Indian tribal courts. Without this ruling, there
is a danger that other courts will follow the Washington judge's
lead. There was no need for this unique sentence, especially in
light of Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, which provides
specific sentencing guidelines. The Court of Appeals should ensure
that state courts comply with the guidelines instead of avoiding
them by referring sentences to tribal courts.
CONCLUSION

The Washington judge's sentencing referral to the American
Indian tribal court was clearly unconstitutional. The banishment
sentence violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. Furthermore, it violated the American Indian Civil Rights Act. Although the Court of Appeals of
Washington ruled that the trial court must sentence the defendants in accordance with Washington's Sentencing Reform Act,
the Appellate Court should rule further and eliminate the courts'
authority to refer sentences to American Indian tribal courts;

188. STRICKLAND, supra note 122, at 170. Often, unfaithful wives had the tips of
their noses sliced off by jealous husbands. HAGAN, supra note 185, at 16.
189. STRICKLAND, supra note 122, at 170.
190. HAGAN, supra note 185, at 15. These barbaric punishments continue to this
day. For example, in Oregon, an American Indian woman complained to officials of
the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Spring Reservation about her daughter's
rebellious and uncontrollable conduct. Id. The teenage daughter socialized with
gangs, drank liquor and was failing school. Id. The tribal justice system administered a ceremonial whipping of the girl, despite the mother's protests. Id. Whipping is a tradition still allowed by some tribal courts. Tribal Officials Whip Girl
Despite Mother's Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at All.
191. See, e.g., GA. CONST.art. I, § I, para. XXI. (1994) (whipping not allowed as a
punishment). But cf Cannon v. State, 190 A.2d 514, 517-18 (1963) (finding that, although whipping a mentally unstable prisoner might well have far reaching and
unwarranted adverse affects upon him as an individual, any change in the state
statute allowing the impositions of lashes must come from the legislature).
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thus, preventing future sentencing judges from considering tribal
court referrals as valid sentencing options.
Stephanie J. Kim

